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This study reports data from a field experiment that was conducted to investigate the 
relevance of gift-exchange for charitable giving. Roughly 10,000 solicitation letters were sent 
to potential donors in the experiment. One third of the letters contained no gift, one third 
contained a small gift and one third contained a large gift. Whether a potential donor received 
a letter with or without a gift was randomly determined. We observe strong and systematic 
effects from including gifts. Compared to the no gift condition, the relative frequency of 
donations increased by 17 percent if a small gift was included and by 75 percent for a large 
gift. Consequently, including gifts was highly profitable for the charitable organization. The 
contribution of this paper is twofold: first, it shows that gift-exchange is important for 
charitable giving, in addition to the warm-glow motive. Second, the paper confirms the 
economic relevance of reciprocity by using field data. This extends the current body of 
research on reciprocity, which is almost exclusively confined to laboratory studies.  
Keywords: charitable giving, field experiments, reciprocity. 
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
This study reports data from a field experiment that investigates the relevance of gift-
exchange for charitable giving. In our study, roughly 10,000 solicitation letters were sent to 
potential donors. One third of the recipients received the letter without a gift, one third 
received a small gift and one third received a large gift. This completely exogenous 
treatment variation created strong and systematic effects: compared to the no gift condition, 
the relative frequency of donations increased by 17 percent if a small gift was included and 
by as much as 75 percent for a large one. Similarly the absolute amount of money donated 
increased substantially if a gift, in particular a large gift, was included. Thus our data provide 
evidence for the relevance of gift-exchange for charitable giving. Initiating such a gift 
exchange was highly profitable for the organization. 
The contribution of this paper is twofold: first it adds to the understanding of the 
motives behind charitable giving. The economic importance of investigating theses motives 
derives from the fact that the amount of donated money is quite substantial in many nations. 
In the US, for example, almost 70 percent of all households make charitable contributions, 
exceeding 1 percent of GDP (Andreoni et al. 1996). The motive that has attracted the most 
attention both in the theoretical and the empirical literature is (impure) altruism or “warm 
glow”, i.e., the internal satisfaction that arises from helping others. Several empirical studies 
have provided evidence that feelings of warm glow are important determinants in the 
decision to donate (Andreoni 1995). While the present study confirms the relevance of this 
motive, it also shows that in addition to warm glow, donors are significantly affected by gift 
exchange considerations. Second the paper extends the research on reciprocal motivation. 
Reciprocity means that people are inclined to reward kind actions, e.g., to repay a gift or a 
favor (for an overview on the empirical literature see Fehr and Gächter 2000). While 
numerous laboratory studies have confirmed the importance of this motive for human 
decision making, there is little field evidence for the relevance of reciprocity. Our study 
provides a step in filling this gap. 
Field experiments offer a particularly well suited research tool for investigating the 
motives behind charitable giving. In contrast with traditional field studies, it is possible to 
create an exogenous variation in the variables of interest in a field experiment. While this 
can also be realized in laboratory experiments, field experiments have the additional 
advantage that people take their actions in their natural environment. In another field 
  1experiment on charitable giving, List and Lucking-Reiley (2002) demonstrate the behavioral 
importance of seed money and refund policies. Increasing seed money from 10 percent to 67 
percent produced an almost sixfold increase in donations. Likewise, the introduction of a 
refund policy increased donations by roughly 20 percent. Frey and Meier (2003) study 
charitable giving to a social fund administered by the University of Zurich. They 
systematically vary the information about other students’ contributions and show that 
students increase their donations if they believe that others have also donated more. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the 
details of the field experiment. Section 3 presents the behavioral predictions. Our results are 
contained in section 4, and section 5 concludes. 
 
2. DESIGN OF THE FIELD EXPERIMENT 
The study was performed in collaboration with a well-known, large charitable organization 
operating internationally. The aim of this organization is the support of children in need. 
Currently the organization is active in 38 countries and engaged in long-term development 
projects as well as in short-term emergency projects. A branch of this organization regularly 
sends out solicitation letters in the canton of Zurich (Switzerland). The organization has a list 
of roughly 10,000 addresses (mainly in the city of Zurich), to whom letters are addressed. 
This list is a so-called “warm” list, i.e., the general response rate to solicitations is relatively 
high. 
A total of 9,846 solicitation letters were sent out in the “2001 Christmas mailing”, 
almost all to private households
1. The purpose of this mailing was to collect money for 
funding schools for street children in Dhaka (Bangladesh). The potential donors were 
informed about the details of the Dhaka project in the letters and asked to donate in its 
support. In addition to this letter, some people received either a “small” or a “large” gift. The 
small gift was one postcard plus envelope, while the large gift consisted of a set of four 
postcards with four envelopes. The postcards showed colored paintings drawn by children; 
an example is displayed in the Appendix. Those who received a gift (either small or large) 
were informed in a short remark at the very end of the letter that the postcards included are a 
“gift from the children from Dhaka”, which “can be kept or given to others”. The purpose of 
                                                 
1 Only 22 of the 9.846 addresses belong to organizations and only one of these organizations 
actually donated (CHF 50). CHF 1 ∼ 0.79 US$. 
  2this sentence was to assure people that the postcards are a gift for which nothing has to be 
paid, and to create a gift-exchange relation between the children (the potential receivers of 
the donation) and the donors. With the exception of this additional sentence, all solicitation 
letters were completely identical regardless of whether a gift was included or not. All letters 
were sent out on December 5, 2001. 
Random selection determined whether a donor received a letter without a gift, with a 
small gift, or with a large one. Each address in the data base was randomly allocated a zero, 
a one or a two (with a random number generator). Those who had a zero were sent the letter 
without a gift, those with a one received a small gift and those with a two received a large 
gift. Our dependent variable is simply the donation decisions by the potential donors. These 
were routinely recorded by the organization. 
 
3. BEHAVIORAL HYPOTHESES 
In our field experiment two distinct behavioral motives may play an important role. The first 
is “warm glow”, i.e., feelings of internal satisfaction that arise from helping people who are 
in need (Andreoni 1989, 1995). Warm glow is a behavioral disposition to donate 
unconditionally, i.e., without getting an extrinsic reward. The second potentially relevant 
motive is gift-exchange or reciprocity. Reciprocity means that “we are obligated to the future 
repayment of favors, gifts, invitations, and the like.” (Cialdini 1992, p. 211, emphasis in the 
original). Reciprocity therefore describes a conditional behavior, e.g., donating as a response 
to receiving a gift
2. The behavioral importance of reciprocity is well documented in many 
laboratory experiments (see, e.g., Fehr and Gächter 2000). A typical example is the study by 
Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993), which shows that trading partners can successfully 
establish a gift-exchange relation. By paying generous prices, buyers induce sellers to 
provide (costly) quality levels above the contractually enforceable level. In particular, the 
higher the price (the gift), the higher the average quality level.
3 
Applying the notions of warm glow and reciprocity to the present experiment yields the 
following behavioral predictions: People endowed with warm glow preferences donate 
                                                 
2 A succinct description of reciprocity is given in the Edda, a 13
th century collection of Norse 
epic verses: “A man ought to be friend to his friend and repay gift with gift. People should 
meet smiles with smiles and lies with treachery.” 
3 These findings, which have recently been replicated in a “real” effort experiment (Gneezy 
2003) support the corresponding efficiency wage argument put forward by Akerlof (1982).  
  3independent of whether they receive a gift or not. They should therefore donate in the no gift 
condition as well as in the two gift conditions. Reciprocally motivated subjects, on the other 
hand, donate because they feel obligated to the repayment of gifts. Thus they are expected to 
donate only in the two gift conditions. Since feelings of obligation should increase as the 
value of the included gift rises, more reciprocally motivated subjects should donate in the 
large compared to the small gift condition.  
Thus in the no gift condition only warm glow is potentially relevant. This condition 
therefore informs us about the behavioral importance of the warm glow motive. In the two 
gift conditions, reciprocity is another possible motive in addition to feelings of warm glow. 
The difference between the gift conditions and the no gift condition therefore reveals the 
potential relevance of gift-exchange considerations
4. Finally, since the value of the gifts is 
higher in the large compared to the small gift condition, the gift-exchange hypothesis 
predicts that we should observe more people donating in the large than in the small gift 
condition. These arguments can be summarized as follows: 
 
GIFT-EXCHANGE HYPOTHESIS: The donation probability is lowest in the no gift condition, 
higher in the small gift condition and highest in the large gift condition.  
 
4. RESULTS 
In this section we first test the Gift-exchange hypothesis, i.e., whether including gifts 
increases the probability of donations. Second, we study whether gift-exchange 
considerations crowd in higher or lower donations, compared to the donations given for 
reasons of warm glow. Third, we address the question, whether the initiation of a gift-
exchange relation is profitable for the organization. To answer the latter question we 
compare the total amount of money donated in the three treatment conditions with the cost of 
providing the gifts. Since we have donation data covering the solicitation subsequent to the 
                                                 
4 Note that an increase in donations between the no gift and the small gift condition could 
also be explained by a hypothesis that combines attention and warm glow. According to this 
hypothesis paying attention to the needs of others is a precondition for acting on altruistic 
preferences. The included postcard could raise attention and make it more likely for people 
to donate. Note, however, that this story cannot convincingly explain possible differences 
between the small and the large gift condition. It is unlikely that the attention arising from 
four postcards is much different than the attention arising from one. 
  4Christmas 2001 mailing, we can further check whether the observed increase in donations in 
the gift conditions is followed by lower donations in the subsequent mailing. This would be 
the case if donators intertemporally substitute. 
 
4.1 Does including a gift increase the frequency of donations? 
Table 1 presents the main results. It reports the donations that were given in the time period 
between December 5, 2001 and the end of February 2002
5 under all three conditions (no gift, 
small gift, and large gift). The first row of Table 1 shows the absolute numbers of letters sent 
out in the three conditions. Rows two and three report the absolute and the relative number 
of people who donated under the three conditions. The results are striking. While the 
absolute number of people who donate under the no gift condition is 397, this number 
increases to 465 in the small gift condition and to 691 in the large gift condition. In relative 
terms, the corresponding numbers are 12, 14 and 21 percent, respectively. Thus including a 
small gift increases the number of donors by 17 percent and including the large gift even 
increases the number of donors by as much as 75 percent. These results clearly support the 
Gift-exchange hypothesis. 
 
TABLE 1: DONATION PATTERNS IN ALL TREATMENT CONDITIONS 
  No gift  Small gift  Large gift 
Number of solicitation  letters  3,262 3,237 3,347 
Number of donations  397  465  691 
Relative frequency of donations  0.12  0.14  0.21 
 
Table 2 shows that the observed treatment effects are statistically significant. We report a 
Probit regression in this table where the dependent variable is a dummy, which takes the 
value 1 if a person donated and zero otherwise
6. This donation dummy is regressed on our 
treatment dummies. The variable “Small gift” is a dummy variable for the small gift 
                                                 
5 We stopped collecting data at the end of February because first, there were essentially no 
further donations after the end of January and second, the next solicitation letter was sent out 
at the end of February (see section 4.3). 
6 All results are qualitatively the same if we use a linear probability model instead of a probit 
model. 
  5condition, while “Large gift” is a dummy variable for the large gift condition. Both 
coefficients are positive and significant at the 1-percent level. Further analysis also reveals 
that the increase in donations between the small gift and the large gift condition is also 
significant at the 1-percent level (Prob>χ
2=.0000). This shows that including a gift in our 
set-up significantly increases the frequency of donations and that the more generous the gift, 
the higher the frequency. 
 
TABLE 2: TREATMENT DIFFERENCES OF DONATION PROBABILITY 
Dependent variable: Donation dummy 
Small gift dummy  0.102*** 
(0.039) 




Number of observations  9,846 
Prob>χ
2  0.000 
Pseudo R
2 0.011 
Note: Probit regression with standard errors in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 
1-percent level. “Small gift” is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the observation comes 
from the small gift condition and zero otherwise. Likewise, “Large gift” is a dummy 
variable, which takes the value 1 if the observation comes from the large gift condition and 
zero otherwise.  
 
4.2 Does gift-exchange crowd in higher or lower gifts? 
The results shown in Tables 1 and 2 support the gift-exchange hypothesis. The inclusion of 
gifts triggers feelings of obligation to repay the gift, which in turn crowd in donations that 
would otherwise not have been given. It is interesting to know whether these additional 
donations are qualitatively similar to those given under the no gift condition. Under the latter 
condition, feelings of warm glow are most likely the dominant motive for donating. Since 
the two motives, warm glow and feelings of obligation, are psychologically different, it 
might well be that they trigger different donation patterns as well. In particular, one might 
hypothesize that feelings of obligation crowd in rather low donations: If the only reason to 
  6donate is to get rid of a “bad conscience” a donor might choose a donation level which just 
compensates the organization for its expenditures. Since the material value of the postcards 
is rather low, donations might be low as well.  
To address this issue Figure 1 shows a histogram of donations for all treatment 
conditions. The figure reveals that overall the distributions are similar. In all conditions 86 to 
89 percent of the donations are below CHF 100 with peaks at values such as CHF 10, 20, 30, 
50 or 100. A closer inspection of the donation patterns shows, however, that there are some 
subtle differences. For low donations up to CHF 60, the cumulative frequency of donations 
is highest in the large gift condition (79 percent), followed by the small gift condition (74 
percent) and the no gift condition (72 percent). Put differently, relatively low donations are 
more frequent under the large gift condition than the no gift condition. The opposite holds 
true for very high donations. This suggests that feelings of obligation may in fact crowd in 
relatively low gifts. To test this claim more directly, we performed two different distribution 
tests. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects that the donation distributions of the no gift and 
the large gift conditions are the same (p=.049).
 Comparing the other distributions yields no 
significant differences (no gift/small gift p=.262; small gift/large gift p=.184). These results 
are supported by the non-parametric Median test, which tests the null hypothesis that two 
samples are drawn from populations with the same median. Again, there is a significant 
difference between the no gift and the large gift condition (p=.031) while the other 
distributions are not significantly different (no gift/small gift p=.532; small gift/large gift 
p=.122). Taken together the data suggest that at least some of the additionally made 
donations in the gift conditions are lower than those in the no gift condition. These 
differences are small, however.  










































4.3 Is the initiation of a gift-exchange profitable for the organization? 
From the charitable organization’s perspective, the relevant question is whether including 
gifts is a profitable strategy. To answer this, we now examine the absolute amounts donated 
under each condition. In doing so, we restrict our analysis to all donations equal or below 
CHF 500. This excludes 39 donations (2.5 percent of all donations). These observations are 
excluded for two reasons. First, they completely blur the analysis of the absolute donation 
levels. To illustrate this, note that there was an extremely high donation of CHF 20,000 in 
the small gift condition, for example. Second, it seems rather unlikely that very high 
donations are affected by the treatment variations
7.  
Table 3 (first row) shows the absolute amount of money collected in the three 
treatment conditions. It amounts to CHF 24,673 in the no gift condition, CHF 27,106 in the 
small gift condition, and CHF 40,877 under the large gift condition. Thus as it holds for the 
relative frequency of donations (see Table 1), the sum of donations is lowest in the no gift 
                                                 
7 Please note that there is nothing special about the cut off value of CHF 500. All results 
reported in this section are qualitatively the same if we consider a different cut off value, 
e.g., donations below CHF 600, CHF 400, CHF 300 etc. 
  8condition, higher in the low gift condition and highest in the large gift condition. The 
quantitative differences are quite substantial. There is a 66 percent increase from the no gift 
condition to the large gift condition, for example. 
 
 
TABLE 3: ANALYSIS OF ABSOLUTE AMOUNTS OF DONATION AND POSSIBLE SUBSTITUTION 
EFFECTS 
  No gift  Small gift  Large gift 
Sum of donations Christmas 2001 mailing  in CHF  24,673   27,106  40,877 
Mean donation Christmas 2001 mailing  in CHF  7.56  8.37  12.21 
Sum of donations February 2002 mailing in  CHF  14,023 13,206 13,165 
Sum of Christmas and February mailing in CHF  38,696  40,312  54,042 
Note: All donations smaller or equal CHF 500  
 
 
It is possible to calculate the organization’s (potential) net benefits given these absolute 
numbers. Note first that total revenue across all three conditions was CHF 92,656. Simple 
extrapolation suggests that if no one had received a gift, revenue would have been much 
lower. If we take the average donation under the no gift condition (see Table 3, second row) 
and multiply it by the total number of letters sent out, we get a hypothetical amount of CHF 
74,472. Since the cost of the postcards was roughly CHF 2,000
8, the net gain of the 
manipulation amounts to CHF 16,184, an increase of about 22 percent. Of course revenues 
could have been even higher if everyone had received the large gift. In this case gross 
revenues would have been CHF 120,248 (average donation under the large gift condition as 
shown in the second row of Table 3, multiplied by the total number of letters). Subtracting 
CHF 4,800, which would have been the cost of sending a large gift (four postcards) to all 
potential donors, yields a net gain of CHF 40,976 or 55 percent when compared to the 
situation where no one receives a gift. Of course these numbers are hypothetical and should 
not be taken at face value. However, they indicate the potential benefits of establishing gift-
exchange relationships. 
                                                 
8 This amount was actually donated by the University of Zurich. 
  9From the organization’s point of view, one important question remains to be answered. 
So far we have shown that including gifts substantially increased donations in the Christmas 
2001 mailing. However, it could be that the two gift treatments have an adverse effect on 
subsequent mailings. This would occur if donors intertemporally substitute their donations, 
i.e., if those donors who donated more in the Christmas 2001 mailing would donate less in 
the next mailing. In this case the organization would not necessarily benefit from sending out 
gifts. We can address this question because we have the donation data of the solicitation that 
followed the Christmas 2001 mailing. It took place at the end of February 2002. Its purpose 
was to collect money in support of poor mothers with little children. The list of addresses 
was the same as for the Christmas mailing. 
If there is intertemporal substitution one would expect that the donation probability 
following the February 2002 mailing should be highest for the group of those donors who 
had not received a gift in the Christmas 2001 mailing, second highest for those who had been 
in the small gift condition and lowest for those who had received the large gift. In fact the 
donation probabilities are 9.6, 8.9 and 8.6 percent for the group of donors who had been in 
the no gift, the small gift and the large gift condition, respectively. Thus, the donation 
probabilities do vary in line with the intertemporal substitution argument. However, the 
differences are rather small, in particular if one compares these differences with the 
differences that occurred in the different treatments of the Christmas mailing. Moreover 
these differences are insignificant. This is shown by a simple Probit regression where we 
regress a donation dummy for the February 2002 mailing on our treatment dummies (exactly 
as in Table 2). The coefficients as well as the whole model are insignificant (p=0.353 for the 
“Small gift” coefficient and p=0.126 for the “large gift” coefficient; for the whole model 
Prob>χ
2=0.3034). 
As it holds with the donation probabilities, the absolute amount of money donated in 
the February 2002 mailing was highest in the no gift condition, followed by the small and 
the large gift conditions (see the third row of Table 3). Again, these differences are relatively 
small and insignificant. This is revealed by an OLS-regression, which regresses all donations 
of the February 2001 mailing on our treatment dummies (p=0.467 for the “Small gift” 
coefficient and p=0.846 for the “Large gift” coefficient; again the whole model is 
insignificant: Prob>F=0.7563). Table 3 (fourth row) also shows that if one adds the 
donations of the Christmas 2001 and the February 2002 mailings, the strong treatment 
  10effects of including gifts in the Christmas mailing persist. Taken together, it is possible that 




This paper has reported data from a field experiment on charitable giving. We studied three 
treatments, which were exogenous to the roughly 10,000 potential donors. In the first 
treatment the solicitation letter included no gift, in the second it included a small gift, and in 
the third it included a large gift. Our results convey a clear message. Including gifts gives 
rise to substantially different donation patterns. In the small gift condition the percentage of 
donations is 17 percent higher than in the no gift condition. In the large gift condition it is 
even 75 percent higher. Numbers are similar if we look at the absolute amounts that were 
donated. 
The relevance of gift-exchange considerations shown in this paper may also help 
explaining the findings of List and Lucking-Reiley (2002). In their experiment, including 
seed money significantly raised donation rates. A possible explanation for this result is that 
subjects perceive seed money as a gift, which is reciprocated with higher donations, just as in 
our field experiment. This explanation is consistent in particular with the fact that donations 
in List and Lucking-Reiley (2002) seem to increase continuously in the level of seed money, 
a finding which is hard to reconcile with existing theories on charitable giving. 
Given our results, it is tempting to conclude that the inclusion of gifts is a simple 
strategy for charitable organizations for collecting additional money. This conclusion, 
however, may be too optimistic. It is likely that the successful initiation of a gift-exchange 
relation depends on various and interacting factors. One important aspect concerns the nature 
of the gift and the message conveyed with it. If we had included gifts which were completely 
unrelated to the purpose of the solicitation or which were considered inappropriate, the 
response might have been weaker or even negative. Another question is whether a gift-
exchange relation can be repeatedly initiated. Surprise may be a key factor. Once donors get 
used to getting gifts, they might not feel obliged to their repayment anymore. More field 
experiments are needed to answer these questions. 
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